On September 28, 2021, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) website published a review article titled "Putting the Russian Hypersonic Threat in Perspective," authored by Dr. Siddhartha Koshar,a research fellow in maritime forces. The article points out that although the threat posed by Russia's hypersonic missiles is real, it should not be overly exaggerated. In fact, if the West exaggerates its ultimate scale and military impact, then the relatively limited hypersonic arsenal may have the greatest value for Russia as a competitive tool in peacetime. The article emphasizes that Russia's hypersonic capability may be more useful as a psychological tool than as a military asset; If a limited number of hypersonic missiles are effectively used, they can become a force multiplier for the Russian military.

The Russian Federation recently announced that it has tested the 3M22 "Zircon" hypersonic cruise missile from one of its "Gorshkov" class frigates, which has raised understandable concerns. Zircon can also be launched from the latest Yasen class submarine of the Russian Navy, reportedly capable of flying at a speed of 8 Mach, greatly increasing the complexity of integrated air defense and missile defense by limiting the warning time for the defending side. The plan to equip all platforms of the Russian surface fleet with the UKSK vertical launch system has increased the possibility that the "Zircon" can become a universal feature for Russian surface and underwater platforms,just like the "Caliber" missiles of the past few decades. Combined with the "Vanguard" hypersonic assisted glide vehicle and the KH47M2 "Dagger" air launched hypersonic quasi ballistic missile, this progress seems to indicate that Russia is leading the West in high-speed long-range strike capabilities. This may put assets such as offshore platforms at risk, making the projection of Western power an urgent issue and potentially increasing the complexity of any anti missile efforts on national territory. However, upon closer examination, a more subtle picture emerges where Russia's hypersonic capability (although certainly powerful) may be more useful as a psychological tool than as a military asset.

Although Russia's efforts to develop long-range precision strike capabilities are noteworthy, these efforts are constrained by many factors. Firstly, there are capacity limitations in the Russian defense industry sector, which is hindered by issues such as poor financial management, corruption, and rising import substitution costs. The increase in import substitution costs is due to strategic control implemented by Western countries after 2014. For example, Elektropribor, an electrical instrument factory located in Voronezh, is on the brink of bankruptcy and manufactures key components for the "dagger". According to the latest public reports,in the first half of 2017, the "Innovator" Experimental Design Bureau (NPO Novator) was able to produce 60 3M-54 caliber missiles for the Russian military. Compared to the demands of modern strike campaigns, this is a limited number: for example, the United States consumed 288 Tomahawk missiles during the relatively short "Desert Storm" operation in 1991.In addition, although "Caliber" is relatively new, it is not as complex as hypersonic missiles like "Zircon", which require expensive specialized materials to withstand extreme temperatures during flight and use complex scramjet engines. Due to industrial restrictions, Russia is unlikely to produce "zircon" on a large scale. For other highly anticipated hypersonic missiles, such as the Dagger, this has been reflected to some extent. As of 2018, only 10 MiG-31 interceptors have been converted into MiG-31K configurations capable of launching "daggers",and Russia's ultimate desire is only to deploy a very limited number of such aircraft. Although this may partially reflect the fact that other platforms such as Tu-22M3M can launch the missile, it may also indicate that the available quantity of these missile assets is limited, therefore only a limited number of launch platforms are needed.

Therefore, given the structural limitations of the Russian defense sector and the inherent cost of producing missiles such as Zircon, it can be expected that hypersonic missiles will not be produced in large quantities, and slower "caliber" missiles will still be the backbone of Russia's long-range strike capabilities. There are also some military considerations that may limit the practicality of Russia's hypersonic capabilities,most notably the limitations of Russia's surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. This may limit the use of hypersonic missiles against moving targets. For example, the Liana constellation of Russia's PION and LOTOS electronic intelligence satellites has not yet been built, while only one of its Persona electro-optical satellites is in operation. The decreasing fleet of Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft will also limit Russia's maritime surveillance options. Given that timely air and space surveillance is crucial for the effective use of hypersonic technology (especially if they are launched from platforms such as submarines that cannot remotely track targets using their own sensors),this will be a major limitation. Of course, for immovable ground fixed facilities, this may not be very important.

This does not mean that hypersonic speeds do not pose a threat. If the limited number of hypersonic missiles are effectively used, they can become a force multiplier for the Russian military. For example, Russia's hypersonic capability can play a destructive role by targeting the anti-aircraft and anti missile radar in NATO's air defense and anti missile system, as well as key command nodes, in order to open up the way for Russia to launch more slower old-fashioned missile strikes. Alternatively, hypersonic missiles can be retained for targeting aircraft carriers and other targets, as such targets have both operational and symbolic significance. If appropriate sensors are used for appropriate prompts, even limited hypersonic forces may pose a real threat to a limited number of key naval main ships and operational failure points such as land command nodes. However, what we should not expect is that the future Russian military will deploy a large number of hypersonic missiles, or these missiles will become the backbone of Russia's precision strike threat.

Hypersonic speed may also play a more subtle role in Russia's strategic thinking, namely in psychological and economic warfare. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian military theorists have studied the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a case study of what they call reflective control.Although its military use was questionable, the initiative sparked a political storm in the Soviet Union, raising the specter of a failed nuclear arms race or forced bankruptcy due to inability to win the arms race. The promotion of Russian hypersonic missiles is entirely possible to emulate the strategic success of SDI, while also consolidating Russia's image as a world power and potentially forcing Western planners to take extremely expensive countermeasures against perceived hypersonic threats. Therefore, considering this threat in a certain context may be crucial to avoid proposing inappropriate strategies.

It should be clarified that countermeasures need to be taken for hypersonic vehicles. However, in taking these measures, it should be recognized that the threat of hypersonic strikes relative to Russia's larger scale subsonic strikes is limited, and strategic overreaction may come at a cost. The Western approach to countering hypersonic threats should emphasize wise defense against a limited number of hypersonic threats, rather than planning an expensive wide area defense system to protect NATO territories from a large number of hypersonic missile attacks,while also defending more conventional cruise missiles and ballistic missiles more broadly. Predicting which high-value targets will become military or political failure points after effective hypersonic attacks is crucial for developing a list of key assets and defense assets in advance. In addition, targeting Russia's limited sensor system and clearing launch platforms, as well as passive defense (establishing resilience in critical military and civilian infrastructure) to disrupt the kill chain that hypersonic capabilities rely on,is crucial for mitigating the threat posed by hypersonic at an acceptable cost.

Source: Aviation Briefing